Antitrust

Acquisitions of Our Lives

Zachary Currie, MJLST Staffer

 

Growing up, my mother was an avid consumer of soap operas, which aired during the daily drought of day-time television. I never watched any soap opera closely, but I occasionally stopped in the living room while one was on and caught a glimpse of the whirling melodrama—after all, the characters were beautiful, handsome, and belonged to a realm of luxury far removed from my paltry existence. The story was always the same; it was always about banal, dynastic feuding, resulting in predictable and outrageous tragedies. But never once did I think that the content of a soap opera was accurate, not in the sense of being based on a true story, but in the sense of being as realistic as a story written by Ernest Hemingway about fishing for marlin in the Gulf Stream. My perception of the quality of soap opera writing changed when I was introduced to the melodramatic world of telecommunication corporations, their acquisitions, and anti-trust law, through its latest garish episode: AT&T’s bid for Time Warner.

 

The latest episode of this soap opera involves players as glamorous, foolish, rich, and powerful as any soap opera cast. A takeover of Time Warner by AT&T would create America’s sixth largest firm by pre-tax profits; the Department of Justice has expressed its disapproval of the star-crossed lovers’ plans to elope. Some important socialites in ermine fur have hinted, with winks, that DoJ is motivated by the Donald’s hatred for CNN, a channel owned by Time Warner. Others belonging to the grapevine scoff at the match, deriding it as unsophisticated and gauche; after all, the marriage will cost over a $100 billion, return on capital is egregiously low, and attempting to increase returns by forcing Time Warner content on AT&T consumers would irritate the ever-watchful and puritanical anti-trust regulators.

So, the plot thickens: is the corporate tryst motivated by an intent to commit some dirty illegality? Well, the DoJ was suspicious and nosy enough to file a suit seeking to block the acquisition. The suit claims that after the acquisition, AT&T would be situated to force rivals to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more per year for Time Warner content, and the new formidable couple would dampen technological innovation. But is the DoJ being disingenuous? Perhaps it is motivated more by priggishness, or, maybe, political vengeance, than a concern to foster competition. Remember, this acquisition is vertical integration rather than horizontal integration; there can be good, healthy reasons for vertical integration. One way in which vertical integration can be efficient is through gaining economies of scale, when average total cost decreases with increasing output; surplus from gaining economies of scale may outweigh social costs caused by imperfect competition. Another advantage of vertical integration is the correction of market governance failures: integration allows firms to internalize the costs that arise from strategic and opportunistic behavior. Has the DoJ seriously considered all the consequences of acquisition? One anonymous attorney general claimed that the DoJ has not been forthcoming with any economic analysis helpful to decide whether to sue. Stay tuned to see the end of this Great American Corporate Love Story. Other juicy details include AT&T’s use of one of Trump’s former lawyers and Trump’s tweets about CNN (including an edited wrestling video showing Trump punching a man whose head is replaced by the CNN logo) for litigation.


Why Antitrust Must Play A Role in Analyzing Drug Patent Settlements

Michael A. Carrier, Distinguished Professor, Rutgers School of Law, MJLST Guest Blogger

Think back several years to, say, 2006 or 2008. The world of drug patent settlements, by which brand-name drug companies pay generics to delay entering the market, was a far different place. A string of appellate courts–the Second, Federal, and Eleventh Circuits–had essentially immunized these agreements by applying a toothless framework based on the “scope of the patent.” The test applied by these courts assumed that the patent was valid and infringed and that a payment for delayed entry could not violate the antitrust laws.

In the landmark case of FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013), the Supreme Court rejected such a narrow view. Writing for a majority of five, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that these settlements “tend to have significant adverse effects on competition” and could violate the antitrust laws. The Court also found that such agreements could demonstrate market power and that the parties had ways to settle other than with payment.

In contrast, writing for three Justices in dissent, Chief Justice John Roberts downplayed antitrust law in contending that “the scope of the patent–i.e., what rights are conferred by the patent–should be determined by reference to patent law.” The claimed reason is that “a patent holder acting within the scope of its patent does not engage in any unlawful anticompetitive behavior” but “simply exercis[es] the monopoly rights granted to it by the Government.”

Roberts combined his exclusive preference for patent law with the position that activity within the nominal scope of the patent is immune from the antitrust laws. A patentee “acting within the scope of its patent has an obvious defense to any antitrust suit: that its patent allows it to engage in conduct that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.” And even though he viewed “the question posed” as “fundamentally a question of patent law,” he lamented that “the majority declares that such questions should henceforth be scrutinized by antitrust law’s unruly rule of reason.”

My short article in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology highlights three significant flaws with Roberts’ opinion. First, Roberts ignored the patent-law policy of challenging and eliminating invalid patents. Second, he downplayed the role of antitrust law. And third, he neglected the importance of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress’s resolution of the patent-antitrust intersection in the pharmaceutical industry.

First is patent law. Empirical studies have consistently shown that at least 40% of patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that are litigated to decision are invalid. For that reason, the Actavis Court recognized the “patent-related policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will not ‘continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.'” Roberts’ suggestion to decide the issue solely on the grounds of patent law does not include this important aspect of patent policy.

Second is antitrust law. As the majority in Actavis recognized, reverse-payment settlements “tend to have significant adverse effects on competition.” Of all the types of business activity subject to the antitrust laws, agreements by which competitors divide markets could be the most dangerous since market division restricts all competition between the parties on all grounds.

Reverse-payment settlements result in generics dropping patent challenges and, in exchange for millions of dollars, agreeing to delay entry into the market. Because the brand makes more by keeping the generic out of the market than the two parties would receive by competing in the market, the parties have an incentive to cede the market to the brand firm and split the monopoly profits.

Third is the regulatory regime. As the Supreme Court has made clear, it is appropriate for courts applying antitrust law to “be attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.” Congress resolved the tension between the patent and antitrust laws in the pharmaceutical industry by enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The Act had a central purpose of encouraging challenges to invalid or not infringed patents during the term of the patent to encourage early market entry. Reverse-payment settlements directly contravene this goal by allowing brands to pay generics for delayed market entry. In short, not only does such conduct flout the patent policy of testing invalid patents and present significant antitrust harm, but it also disregards the Hatch-Waxman Act and important public-policy goal of increasing the number of affordable generic medicines.

As courts begin to interpret drug patent settlements in the wake of Actavis, they should not follow the approach to patent and antitrust law articulated by Chief Justice Roberts. For in addition to being rejected by the Supreme Court, it (1) shortchanges patent law, which includes a policy goal of testing invalid patents to ensure they do not block competition; (2) downplays antitrust law’s role in monitoring behavior that resembles market division between potential rivals; and (3) ignores the Hatch-Waxman Act’s encouragement of challenges to patents that are invalid and not infringed.


Trusting Antitrust Law: Anti-Competitive Agreements in the Technology Industry

by Mayura Iyer, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Recently, the District Court of the Northern District of California certified a group of plaintiffs as a FRCP 23(b)(3) class in the High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation case. This case is a consolidation of five underlying cases instituted by individual plaintiffs against Adobe Systems, Inc., and the class action is now taking on some of the biggest names in Silicon Valley, including Apple, Google, Intel, and Pixar.

The plaintiffs, a group including software and hardware engineers, programmers, and other employees of the high-tech industry, are relying on principles of antitrust law to show that their employers made unlawful, anti-competitive agreements. They are alleging that their employers engaged in a conspiracy to eliminate competition for skilled labor by entering into agreements with each other that prohibited them from poaching each other’s employees. Interestingly, all the companies involved were either associated with Steve Jobs, former Apple CEO, or shared at least one common director with Apple’s Board of Directors, suggesting a concerted effort among executives of these companies.

As a result of these agreements, wages for technical professionals like the plaintiffs have been artificially suppressed, since the employers have created a non-competitive environment for recruiting employees. With the class potentially including 64,000 plaintiffs, these companies are likely to settle. However, if any of these claims do go through to trial, the defendants will likely have large hurdles in their path, since there is electronic documentation of communications between executives acknowledging the existence and potential illegality of their gentlemen’s agreements.

These agreements have stifled competition within the technology industry by limiting the forces of the free market. The best talent was not allowed to be competitively recruited, thus devaluing those employees and consequently, likely suppressing innovation. Regardless of whether these cases are resolved through settlements or through trial, the fact that these back-door agreements have been brought to light is likely to change the landscape of the technology industry in a major way. Breaking the cycle of these anti-competitive practices will likely change the ways in which employees in this sector are recruited and compensated and perhaps will also encourage innovation and the transfer of ideas. While these companies will likely still be able to protect themselves through other safeguards such as non-compete clauses, perhaps now the scales of the technology industry will tip further towards equalizing the power between the employers and their most invaluable intellectual resources, their technical employees.